

THE MAMLUK CONQUEST OF CYPRUS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.(1)

by

M. Mustafa Ziada

Part I.

In April 1422, the Mamluk Sultan Barsbey stepped on to the throne of Egypt, amid the peculiar intriguing and violent wire-pulling behind the scenes, which characterised the accession of nearly all the Sultans of the Mamluk period. For many years before Barsbey's accession, the relations between Egypt and Cyprus were occasionally strained, owing to the recurrent depredations of Frankish pirates, mostly from Cyprus, on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts (2). These were becoming serious in 1422. Thus, one night in July of that year, a batch of Frankish pirates, in two grabs (3) hailing from some Cypriot cove, surprised the port of Alexandria, and after an uneven fight that lasted all night, plundered and destroyed a merchant ship with 100,000 dinars' worth of goods. They sailed westward towards Barka, where they ravaged the coast, laying their hands on what they could, and were some days later sighted off Alexandria sailing eastwards (4). About the same time in the following year, it was rumoured in Cairo that the corsairs were going to repeat the process, and, on the strenght of the rumour, Sultan Barsbey despatched several emirs to guard the Egyptian and Syrian shores (5). The corsairs did not make an appearance, however, until June 1424, when they seized near Damietta two Muslim ships, laden with a considerable cargo, and captured more than a hundred men on board (6). Barsbey was enraged, and began to make preparations for a naval expedition to set out, not particularly to Cyprus, but merely to ascertain which of the nationals of the neighbouring countries were pirating the seas (7).

Janus of Lusignan, King of Cyprus (1399-1432), and his subjects, were directly, though not solely, concerned in these depredations, for Janus himself rashly encouraged Christian pirates to prey upon the Egyptian coasts. They were not necessarily Cypriots, but they used the numerous inlets and creeks of the Island as their base. Janus' subjects, besides, purchased the goods which the pirates pillaged, and bought the prisoners whom they brought for slave work (8). This state of affairs went on intermittently during the period between 1404 and 1414. At last, a peace was made with the ruling Mamluk Sultan, and a Cypriot envoy was expressly sent to Cairo to conduct negotiations. He brought back with him a Mamluk official to fix the terms of peace, and, besides, to buy all Egyptian captives in Cyprus (9). Janus showed remarkable friendliness towards the Egyptian envoy, and on the occasion of ransoming the 535 Muslim prisoners in Cyprus, the King accepted the sum of 10,000 dinars for the release of four hundred of them, and paid the ransom of the remaining 135, amounting to 3375 dinars from his privy purse (10). The conditions of the peace were equally gratifying to the Sultan: Janus "promised not to allow pirates to be received any more in his island, nor to send pirates into Syria; and if pirates should come, he would not give them provisions from Cyprus, and no one was to take upon himself to buy spoil" (11).

It appears, however, that the peace was not at all popular among the people of Cyprus themselves, for they too had become "accustomed to go pillaging upon the Sultan's coasts" (12). Peace with the Sultan therefore meant an irksome stoppage of plunder and booty, and thus they scoffed at the peace proclamation, which was issued at Nicosia in November 1414. To them the anxiety of the Mamluks for peace, belied fear on the part of the Sultan and his emirs. Thus once again piracy became rampant; knights and officials of high position in the King's service abetted the malefactors, "and the spoil was being bought secretly by Philip Picquigny the bailië of Lemeso and Sir John Gasel, the commander of Alikî" (13).

Barsbey protested against such rank breach of the peace, and threatened dire reprisals, to which Janus replied in defiant terms, and even connived at the seizure by two Cypriot ships

of an Egyptian grab, which had been sent with costly gifts to the new Sultan of Turkey (14). Other causes of war by no means lacking: The insulted Sultan "resolved to avenge the people of Alexandria upon the Cypriot Efrengh, who had once in 1368 seized the town", and departed with 5000 prisoners (15). He was, moreover, encouraged by one captain Fadil, a certain citizen of Ayas, who assured him of Cypriot guilt and of easy booty and enormous plunder, if only he undertook the campaign (16). To this, it might be as well to add here, was joined the encouragement of the Sultan by the Genoese as well as the Kai-Kobad prince of Alaya, although their sinister machinations did not take place until 1425, and were directed so that the Sultan might prosecute the war, to which he had already committed himself (17). Moreover, in 1422 Barsbey, the strongest of his dynasty, came to the throne and was eagerly playing for popularity during his first years. It is possible, besides, that he saw in the waging of war against the Lusignans a means of occupying his unruly emirs, and of diverting their courage and prowess, often employed against the person of the Sultan, to feats of valour in a campaign that had the semblance of a holy war (18).

Barsbey could not boast, however, that his war against Cyprus was the first of its kind in Muslim annals. As early as the first days of the lightning conquests of Islam, an expedition was sent by Muawiya, first of the Umayyads, to the Island of Cyprus in 649. It did not result in a permanent occupation, but was merely a robber raid, on the occasion of which the town of Salamis-Constantine was destroyed (19). Yet it was classed by the annalists of the fifteenth century, as the most heroic and most successful of all attempts against the Island, the like of which was vouchsafed only to Sultan Barsbey (20). The second Muslim expedition against the Island took place in 653; and this led to the first step towards the settlement of the Faithful in the country. Muslim suzerainty was made more visible in 688, when it was agreed, between the Umayyad Khalifa and the Emperor Justinian II, that the Cypriot tribute be divided between the two supreme powers. Under the Abbassids, successful expeditions against Cyprus took place in the reign of Harun al-Rashid and even later, but on all those occasions the permanent occupation of the Island was not thought of, and Byzantine influence was

always predominant. Centuries later, the Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus was always a handy and powerfull ally of the Crusaders against the Muslims; and it continued to be a permanent menace to the Mamluk Empire, which was founded in Egypt in the latter half of the thirteenth century. Beybars I, who is rightly considered the founder of that Empire, sent a fleet against Cyprus in 1270, which was however wrecked off Limassol, the town which was to suffer siege and rapine on each of the three expeditions of Barsbey (21).

The first of these expeditions took place in 1423. It consisted of a small flotilla of five sail in all, of which only two brigantines, with eighty Mamluks on board, were fitted out from Egypt (22). These set out from Bulak, the port of Cairo, on 7 August 1424, and were eagerly joined at Damietta by a "sallura" carrying numerous volunteers (23). They were further reinforced by two more ships from Beyrut and Sidon, which raised the total of the troops to a considerable number (24).

It is well to say here once more, that the purpose of this first expedition was to fix the responsibility for the prevalent piracy on the sea, and to make sure of the real attitude of the King of Cyprus to the daring depredations on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts. The flotilla reached the Cypriot shores at at Ras Alyak (Cape Gatto) south of Limassol, where it surprised a merchant ship, and seized its goodly cargo, after the crew had abandoned it in panic (25). Having set fire to the empty boat, the Egyptians proceeded to al-Lamsun (Limassol) "to reprove the Magistracy" for their culpable connivance at the recent outrages on the Sultan's coasts (26).

King Janus had been forewarned of the approach of the flotilla, and had made preparations for the defence of Limassol by land and sea (27). Thus on their arrival at the port of Limassol, the Mamluk ships came up against three fully armoured grabs which they, however, routed and set in flames, after having stripped them of all war tackle. Soon afterwards, the vanguard of the concentrated land forces, numbering seventy horsemen and thirty foot soldiers, headed by captain Philippe Provosto and by the bailiff of Limassol, Philippe de Picquigni, appeared on the scene. The captain met his death early in the encounter, upon which the bailiff fled, and the leaderless vanguard retreated, leaving some slain and a few

prisoners. The Egyptians cut off the head of the dead captain, and then pounced upon the neighbourhood, sacking and plundering to their fill (28). The idea of attacking the castle of Limassol was seriously mooted among them, but they soon found that it would entail a long siege, for which they were not prepared (29). In consequence, they sailed away in the direction of Kouklia, in the vicinity of old Paphos, meeting on their way two galleys from Gorhigos, one of which they set on fire, and the other they ultimately towed home, after having committed great havoc at the town of Kouklia (30).

The flotilla departed from Cyprus towards the end of September 1424, and arrived at Bulak on the 14th of the following October, with 23 prisoners and a considerable booty, which consisted of Venetian piece goods of broadcloth, cotton fabrics and furniture, as well as large jars of honey and preserved butter. Barsbey disposed of the booty "according to the law of God", said 'Aini; but on the authority of Mak-rizi, who had no cause to mince words for the sake of the Sultan, Barsbey was presented with 103 piece-cloth which "were sold to the merchants, and he gave nothing to the warriors (31).

Encouraged by this quick success, and informed of the real attitude of the King of Cyprus, Barsbey resolved upon a grand expedition, and in this he was supported by the people of Cairo, who now yearned for a holy-war (dijihad) (32). Thus, hardly had the affairs of the last expedition been settled than he ordered, in November 1424, that new galleys be built at Bulak (33). The work was hastened and diligently supervised by the Sultan himself, who, as soon as some of the boats were launched, began in April 1425 to enlist a considerable number of soldiery, giving the general command to the emir Djerbash al Karimi, grand Chamberlain, who was also known by the name of Kashok (34). He appointed two Mukaddams of a Thousand, two Lords of the Drum, three Emirs of a Twenty, and about 400 of his own Mamluks, to whom were added ten Mamluks from each Mukaddam and two from each Emir of the Drum in Cairo. He also employed a number of retired emirs as well as naphtha throwers, sword-menders and lancers. In short, there were ready for the expedition from Egypt 600 fighters, whom the Sultan paid, and 300 whom the emirs procured (35). On June 7 the horses, to

the number of 300, were sent by land to Tripolis; and two days later all the boats of the flotilla, consisting of eight grabs, were in full trim for sailing. The Sultan rode to Bulak on that day to review the splendid array; and on the morrow his son rode to the harbour to watch the departure of the first four (36).

In spite of his preoccupation with this feverish preparation, Barsbey was not unmindful of the possibility of a retaliatory attack by the King of Cyprus on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts, and he managed in February 1424 to complete the building of a watch tower at the sea town of al-Tina near Damietta. The necessity of that tower had long been felt, but in the circumstances it was quickly built and amply garrisoned (37). A month later, a rumour was in the air that the Franks were about to make a surprise attack on the Sultan's shores, and Barsbey despatched several emirs to put the various ports of Egypt and Syria on guard (38). The rumour was not groundless, for, on hearing of what had befallen his galleys and his army at Limassol in the past year, Janus prepared four galleys for making reprisals (39). Two of them went prowling round the Syrian coast under the command of Thomas Provosto, who surprised the Syrian town of Sur in March 1425, and sailed away after a short battle which cost the garrison 50 killed. They proceeded thence to the little town of Djebel where, however, they did not fare so well (40). Finally, they steered towards the estuary of Nahr-al-Kalb in search of fresh water, but they were ambushed and had to set sail quickly, leaving the landing party to the mercy of their captors (41). But they were soon able to retaliate, for on their way to Cyprus they encountered a Muslim carrier ship, which was bound for Egypt with a cargo of oars from al-Lathikiya (Laodica). They boarded the boat and killed the crew, except for a tall Mamluk whom they captured and put in prison. He was no less a person than Captain Fadil, who had so vigorously encouraged the Sultan to invade Cyprus (42).

The other two galleys, which Janus had fitted out, were commanded by Don Palol, the Bala of the Arabic chronicles, and their mission was to waylay the Egyptian flotilla at the Egyptian sea-ports of embarkation. Bala lay in wait off the estuary of Damietta, but on sighting the flotilla of eight

brigs, which had sailed recently from Bulak, he plainly saw the futility of giving battle and sailed away (43).

The eight vessels sailed from Damietta on 7 July, 1425, and were joined first at Beyrut and then at Tripolis by many more ships, Mamluks, volunteers and camp followers. The flotilla now numbered close on forty sail — 5 men-of-war, 19 galleys, 6 horse-transports, and 12 galliots (44). Before the general order to sail from Tripolis was given, Djerbash al-Karimi, the commander-in-chief, sent to Janus a message of peace, enjoining him to surrender and pay homage to the sultan; but the King declared for war (45). In consequence the flotilla unfurled sail on 30 July, arrived four days later at Korbass (Karpas) on the north-east coast of Cyprus, and was in the vicinity of Famagusta on 4 August (46). There, all the horsemen and most of the foot soldiers disembarked, and pitched their tents (47). Friendly Famagusta was peacefully surrendered; its Genoese governor hoisted the Sultan's standard on the castle, and told the invaders all he knew of Cypriot preparations (48). For three days the Mamluk troops raided the country west of Famagusta, during which they were timidly followed from one village to another by a small Cypriot army. This was commanded by the King's brother, the Prince of Galilee, who managed to discomfit a scouting party of 20 Egyptians near the village of Stillus, and pushed them back to their boats, less six killed and one prisoner (49).

The flotilla then sailed towards al-Mallaha (Salt-Pans near Larnaka), having left 400 soldiers to watch for the enemy, who was still following them (50). The footsoldiers rejoined the boats in the morning at Ras al-Adjus (Cape Greco), bringing with them a whole company of thirty prisoners, whom they had surprised and captured near by, together with their leading officers, in the small hours of the morning (51). No sooner had they passed Pyla, and were in sight of Larnaka, than a Cypriot fleet of eleven sail came in sight, and without giving battle simply took to flight (52). This was only a feint, which failed to draw the Muslim flotilla to the open sea; and in consequence the Cypriot fleet returned and challenged the Muslims to battle. A hot naval fight ensued, in which the Egyptians hurled missiles from their arquebuses and bombards, and the Cypriots replied with Greek fire. But the Egyptians moved abreast, and approached their challeng-

ers with the intention of boarding their ships, and as a result the Cypriots retreated, and gave up the day. Thus were dashed the hopes of the King's brother, who had quartered himself at Aradippou, and was watching the battle from a distance (53).

The Egyptians then steered into the harbour of al-Mallaha; there they sighted a company of about 300 Cypriots, whom the prince of Galilee had sent to engage the Saracens as soon as they disembarked. They were routed, and the Muslims seized the occasion and sacked the salt-Pans and the neighbouring villages including Aradippou. They ravaged much, and captured many prisoners to the number of 492 (54). Their booty was further swollen by the seizure of three munition carts, sent by the King for the assistance of al-Mallaha, which they had just laid in ruins (55). On the following day, 11 August, the Prince of the Galilee gave up the idea of engaging the Mamluks in further battle, on the advice of his consellers, whom "the King had given to the Prince, they being wise men" (56).

A couple of days later the Egyptians proceeded to al-Lamsun, where they arrived on 15 August. Their objective was the castle of the town, and they landed a company of 150 men with some Mamluks for its capture. They had no great difficulty in storming it, as they had been previously informed of an unguarded part of the wall by some escaped Muslim slaves. Thus, although its garrison fought stoutly, its surrender was a foregone conclusion. On 16 August, which coincided with the beginning of the Lesser Bairam, the Muslims triumphantly celebrated the day by hoisting the Sultan's standard on the ramparts of the hapless castle of Limassol (57).

Before the Muslims had decided on the next step, they were warned by a fugitive company of Egyptian prisoners from Piskopi that Venice had just sent aid to the Cypriots (58). This news, added to the rumour that the King of Cyprus was about to send his armies against them under a new command, spread fear in the ranks of the victorious, who were becoming tired of the war, and were perhaps eager to carry their booty into safety by going home (59). The commander-in-chief likewise deemed it opportune to depart, and issued, with the consent of the rest of the emirs, a general order to prepare for

return (60). Meanwhile the Cypriot army under the command of the Viscount of Nicosia appeared, but soon retreated after being worsted in several engagements, and the Mamluk commander-in-chief thought it high time to unfurl sail (61).

The first news from Cyprus concerning the expedition arrived Cairo on 24 August 1425, announcing the land and sea victories at the Salt-Pans. The Mamluk Capital went en fête, and the Sultan ordained that the joyful despatch be read publicly at the mosques of Amr b. al-'As and Al-Ashrafiya. Four days later, however, news came announcing the arrival of the expedition at al-Tina, which was hastily construed as meaning that the initial successes of the expedition had been reversed. The people's glee was damped, and the Sultan swore that he would immediately send a larger expedition. But the courier, who arrived from al-Tina a few days later, explained everything, and the people cheered (62). The victors entered Cairo on 9 September, and went up to the Sultan on the morrow in a triumphal procession with 1060 prisoners and a grand booty, which was carried by 170 porters, 10 camels and 4 mules (63). When all was reviewed by the Sultan, he commanded that prisoners be publicly sold, and the booty be valued; but to his credit it must be recorded that he gave strict instructions not to separate the parents from their children or other near relatives (64). The sale was conducted by Inal al-Shishmani, Lesser Chief of the Guard, and supervised by Djakmak al-'Alai, Master of the horse, who was destined to become Sultan. On the authority of the former, the proceeds of the sale amounted to the considerable sum of 23,300 Dinars, all of which went to the state treasury after each adventurer had been paid $3\frac{1}{2}$ or 7 Dinars (65).

It appears that in the wake of the victors, a Cypriot peace mission, consisting of Don Thomaso Provosto and Don Jean Podochataro, arrived in Damascus with the intention of approaching the Sultan through one Shaikh Muhammed Ibn Kodaidar, a pious man of great esteem in Syria (66). Indeed, it was rumoured in Cairo that Janus had written to the Governor of Damascus, offering to make peace with the Sultan (67). It is certain, moreover, that Shaikh Muhammed, in order to further the prospects of peace, sent his own son to Cyprus to convince the King of the necessity of mollifying the Sultan, but the King's counsellors could see nothing but a

ruse in the presence of the pious man's son, whom the King was not allowed to see, and the peace overtures were brought to a close (68).

Janus was intent upon war, and appealed to Christendom for military aid; but the response was very poor. He applied to Venice for a loan of money on ample surety, and asked for troops and crossbowmen from the Republic; but Venice declined to give any help, and even prohibited its nationals from participating privately in the campaign, thus cutting off the possibility of such private aid as had reached Cyprus from the Venetian sugar merchants during the last campaign (69). Constantinople, decrepit and senile herself, could not possibly give any material aid, but the Emperor sent a messenger to Cairo with a rich gift, to intervene on behalf of the Cypriots. Yet though the Sultan graciously accepted the present, he rejected the mediation for peace (70). Castile sent no official help; but a Castilian adventurer named Mosen Saurez, who became in later years admiral of the Cypriot fleet, joined the King's forces and fought in his ranks (71). Rhodes and the Knights of the Order of St. John, on the other hand, had vested interests in Cyprus, and the Master of the Order prided himself on being the guardian and protector of the Lusignan House. Like the Emperor of Constantinople, he failed in mediating for peace, but sent considerable help of ships, men and munitions (72). Ali of Karaman, who had suffered imprisonment in Cairo at the hands of the Egyptian Sultans, and was then on friendly terms with Cyprus, also gave aid in the form of allowing Janus to hire Karaman soldiery for the campaign (73).

Barsbey was also equally intent on war. He had intended no such hasty return as his troops had made on their own initiative, but meant a permanent conquest of Cyprus. He was further encouraged by the reports of the returning warriors, who related to him that the Cypriots "were not cunning in war", and also by some Genoese nationals in Alexandria, who, apparently on instructions from home, told the Sultan that the King of Cyprus had no forces left to set against his hardy troops. Their idea was clearly to keep Janus occupied with the Egyptians, so that he would have no time to entertain again the dream of recovering Famagusta. Barsbey was also importuned by the Kaikobad prince of 'Alaya to prosecute

the war. That prince had everything to gain by the war, for his puny principality was always threatened by the allied powers of the Lusignan and the Karaman, of whom the former held Gorbigos as a sword over his head, and the latter hemmed in his territories on land. And lastly, the news that Janus had applied to the Courts of Europe for aid, to make a concerted attack on the ports of Egypt and Syria, decided Barsbey to abandon any idea of peace, which was at best remote (74).

Barsbey prepared everything on a grand scale, to ensure success for the third expedition. He commissioned a considerable number of Egyptian emirs, and allotted the land and sea commands, giving the former to Taghribardi al-Mahmudi, Supreme Chief of the Guard, and the latter to Inal al Djakmi, Master of the Audience, with express instructions not to infringe upon each other's sphere of command (75). The army itself numbered about 5000 men, of whom a considerable portion consisted of volunteers, who had calmed and begged for leave to join the "holy war". Some of these, being refused on account of lack of transport, even joined without the knowledge of the Sultan as camp followers (76). Considerable contingents of Syrian Bedouins, and Mamluk solidery from Damascus, Safad, Gaza, and Tripolis, formed another feature of the army of the expedition. They arrived in Cairo, and paraded the streets amid the loud cheers of the populace; and shortly after, began to make their way to Bulak where all troops assembled ready to sail (77). On June 1st. they set out in a flotilla that consisted of about 100 vessels of all types and sizes, expecting to be joined off Rosetta by a squadron of five caracks from Alexandria. But before that took place, the flotilla met near Rosetta with a violent storm, which wrecked four ships and cost the expedition ten lives and a hundred horses, besides a considerable amount of provisions (78). The mishap nearly decided the Sultan to postpone the expedition till the next year, had it not been for the persuasion of the historian 'Aini (79). The damage was expeditiously repaired, and the flotilla went its way to rejoin the squadron of Alexandria, which had returned to its base until the repairs were completed. There, it was surprised by four Cypriot men-of-war, which had been lying in wait off the coast to repeat more successfully the attempt of the last year. But the encounter

ended in Egyptian victory, owing to the timely arrival of the greater part of the main flotilla from Rosetta (80).

The combined fleet steered directly to Cyprus this time, and cast anchor on 1st July 1426, at Livadia on the coast of Avdimu, a few miles from Limassol. The land forces disembarked and pitched their tents, while the sea troops remained aboard in full readiness and preparedness for battle in case Frankish ships appeared on the scene (81). Then a mounted detachment of the land forces set out towards the castle of Limassol, which to their astonishment they found to have been thoroughly repaired and fortified with a new deep moat. They attacked the walls diligently, and succeeded in scaling at one side of the rampart, thanks to the intrepid valour of their commander, Yashbak Karkash, a noted knight, who set the example and was followed by many others. The soldiers of the garrison, who had been boiling tar to pour on the attackers, were surprised and hid themselves; but they were slain to a man, and the Egyptians hoisted the Sultan's standard amid their customary shouts of "Allahu Akbar" (82). Then they proceeded with the work of levelling the castle, and for six days Limassol and its neighbourhood suffered grievously at their hands. This work was partly interrupted by the entry into the port of Limassol of a Cypriot galley which, however, took to flight at sight of two challenging Egyptian grabs. It was pursued along the shore by Egyptian horsemen, who soon descried it at anchor, and spurred their mounts towards its disembarking men, whom they put to the sword. They returned in triumph with five heads, which they suspended from the shattered walls of the castle of Limassol (84).

The sack of Limassol was deemed enough to bring Janus to his knees, and thus before the Egyptians had taken any further steps, they sent a herald to the King summoning him to surrender (85). Three days earlier, Janus had given the order for a general march from Nicosia, and he was already at Potamia at the head of the army when the Mamluk messenger arrived; the latter was refused audience and was tortured to death (86). In consequence the land and sea forces of the invaders decided on 7 July, which was the first day of the month of Ramadan, to advance separately towards the Salt-Pans. But the former had only covered a very short distance

when they found themselves face to face with the vanguard and skirmishers of the King's army, which had arrived two days earlier at the village of Kherokitia on the river Vassilipotamo. The vanguard offered no battle, but hurried back to their headquarters with many wounded, who gave Janus painful and palpable assurance that the Egyptians were at hand (87).

Janus arranged his troops in squadrons of 100 and of 50, and gave instructions that the foot-soldiers should advance in "testudo" form. The Egyptians came very quietly over the top of the hill towards the plain, and pounced upon the Cypriots, but were repulsed and forced to retreat. The King failed to follow up his first advantage with a hot pursuit, as his army was unreasonably panic-stricken and would not advance. The greater number of the footmen abandoned their arms and fled, because they were not skilled in fighting. Confusion followed and chaos ruled, and the Mamluks, renewing the battle, won the day. They overtook and slew the King's brother, who had with singular brutality set fire to the hanging dead body of the Mamluk herald, on his return after the first attack. They also captured King Janus, as well as Mosen Saurez, near the gate of the village tower. "Then they turned back, and all those whom they found weary they slew, and the others they hacked to pieces" (88).

The troops followed the victory with the usual ravage and rapine, pillage and plunder, all over the neighbourhood. They crowned their vandalism with setting fire to the Church of the Great Cross on Mount Staurowuno (Djabal al-Salib), after which they repaired as pre-arranged to the Salt-Pans. There, they were shortly joined by the sea forces on 10 July 1426, and the naval commander received the captive King on board (89).

At that juncture, abundant evidence reached the Egyptians that though Janus was now in their hands, his other brother, the Bishop of Nicosia, was fortifying the Cypriot Capital, and arming to give them battle. In consequence the emir Taghribardi al-Mahmudi marched to the Capital, with the main part of the land army (90). Suddenly, however, but much too late to undo the disaster of Kherokitia, a huge Christian fleet appeared off Larnaka, and a great sea fight, in which two pilgrim ships were fatally involved, raged on 10 July from

dusk till dawn of the next morning (91). Under cover of darkness, the Egyptians tried to board some of the Cypriot boats, in spite of a heavy discharge of missiles, and they finally managed to capture one caravel in the morning twilight. This seems to have decided the battle, as shortly afterwards the Cypriot flotilla took to the open sea (92).

Taghribardi on the other hand reached Nicosia, from which, contrary to the alarming news, the Bishop had departed to Kerynia with the King's son and daughter, leaving Stathi Burelli as governor (93). The town offered no resistance; indeed some of its dignitaries, who spoke the language of the invaders, took torches and welcomed them into the city in the small hours of the morning of Thursday, 11 July (94). Elated but surprised at this strange success, Taghribardi betook himself to the King's palace, where he pitched his headquarters. He asked to be informed of the revenues from the royal dues, and was tactfully silenced by a handsome sum of money, with more to follow for the coffers of the Sultan. On that understanding, he issued a proclamation of safety and security, and all was well (95). On the morning of the following Friday, however, a Mamluk corps arrived from Larnaka, but as the soldiers had not heard of the general proclamation, they began to plunder the houses and the churches and the monasteries. Their raid developed into general slaughter and a fierce sword fight; and they crowned their outburst, which had already lasted two days and one night, with setting fire to the King's palace from which al-Mahmudi, their commander-in-chief, was extricated with great difficulty (96). With no more booty to loot, they all left Nicosia in chaos, and returned to the Salt-Pans.

The conquest of the island was accomplished, and the invaders had realised their highest expectations. They decided to go home, and sent a courier to announce the news, but stayed for seven days at the Salt Pans, resting and celebrating their victory (97). The Sultan and his people were indeed thirsting for news, for since the great tidings of the sack of Limassol, which had arrived in Cairo in July, and made the metropolis rejoice, nothing had been heard (98). Thus on the arrival of the courier Cairo went en fête, and the shawms and flutes and hautbois and drums of the Citadel were ordered to play for three days (99). The Sultan was radiant with

delight, and his eyes watered out of sheer joy (100). Elaborate preparations and decorations were set afoot for the reception of the victors, whose first arrivals reached Damietta early in August (101). Cairo went out to witness the entry of the triumphal procession; and its crowds were swollen by innumerable people, who had come especially from the provinces to see the return of the conquerors, after such brief but decisive campaign (102). The crown and the royal banners of Cyprus were carried in triumph through the streets, in front of King Janus and Mosen Saurez, who were mounted on mules, and followed by a couple of thousand prisoners (103). The King was dismounted at Bab-al-Mudarradj of the Citadel, where he kissed the ground, and was then led, bareheaded and in irons, to the presence of the Sultan, who was surrounded by a brilliant Court, at the head of which sat the Sharif of Mecca himself. By a strange coincidence a splendid array of foreign envoys from Turkey, Turkhoman principalities and Tunis, as well as representatives of Syrian governors and vassals, was also present (104). Janus was ordered to kiss the ground before the Sultan, at which he fainted, but on recovery he bowed to adversity and pitifully complied (105). He was then taken aside, so that Brasbey might gloat over the parade of booty and wretched prisoners, which was followed by the march past of the units of the victors (106). Janus was then brought to the presence, and again kissed the ground; he was left standing for a long while until the Sultan had a long look at him, after which he was removed in honourable custody to the tower of the Citadel. Barsbey then bestowed the customary robes of honour on the victorious emirs, and the ceremony was at an end (107).

(To be continued).

NOTES.

- 1 — The subject of this essay is part of chapter IV. of my thesis, presented in October 1930, to the Department of Mediaeval History, University of Liverpool, for the Degree of Ph. D. Since then, the Chronicle of Makhairas, written in Cypriot Greek, has been edited with translation and notes by Professor R.M. Dawkins (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1932). The edition needs no praise, and the Chronicle itself contains much new information, otherwise lacking or obscure in the sources previously drawn upon. Not only that Makhairas was an eyewitness of the battle of Kherokitia in 1426, which decided the fate of Cyprus in the Fifteenth century, but his narrative showed that he was fairly in the know of inner information (See Makhairas: Op. cit. vol. 1 pp. 619, 653, 659, 665). Moreover, the Chronicle of Strambaldi, extracts of which are in M. Mas Latrie's collection of documents relating to the history of Cyprus (Op. cit. vol. 1. pp. 527-544), and which the present writer had formerly utilised, is a translation into Italian of the more concise of the two existing versions of Makhairas, from which Dawkins edited his work, (Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. II. Introd. pp. 1, 5.)

For the purpose of this essay too, another contemporary source of information has been consulted. This is a part of a Chronicle written in Arabic by Sâleh Ibn Yahya, who served in one of the Sultan's expeditions against Cyprus as sea captain, and is especially enlightening on the naval side of the war. It is to be found in M. le P. Louis Sheikh: *Un Dernier Echo des Croisades : Appendice à l'Histoire de Beyrouth et des émirs d'Al-Garb de Salih ibn Yahya, texte et traduction* (Mélange de la Faculté Orientale, Université St. Joseph, Beyrouth, Syrie 1906, Vol. I. pp. 303-375).

- 2 — See below.

- 3 — The English equivalent to the Arabic word « غراب », meaning a certain type of war craft, is given in the Dictionary « الفوائد الدرية » as corvet. Johnson's Arabic-Persian-English Dictionary gives the English word grab for it. This is connoted in Webster's International Dictionary thus : « Grab... a coasting vessel of light draft and broad beam, with square raking stern, and sharp bow with long overhang, used in the East. It has lateen sails and usually two masts ». Dozy (Supp. Dict. Ar.) gives the following as meaning for « غراب » : « galère... brigantin, petit vaisseau à voile et à rames pour aller en course ». Names of various other types of naval and merchant marine of Egypt occur in the Arabic chronicles of the Fifteenth century, but the exact English equivalent to some of them is not always to be found. These are طراد. سلوة. قرقوة. جرم. بنف. شحورة. شني. مركب غروط. مركب مروس. حراقة. نقالة. غراب. حمالة. Torr's work (Ancient Ships, Cambridge, 1894) throws light on

some of these names of ships; see also Charles Bourel la Roncière : *Histoire de la Marine Française* (Five vols. Paris 1899-1920). The last two names in this list i.e. « بنف جرم » need some special explanation. The word « بنف » occurs in the Chronicle of Sâleh ibn Yahya in the plural form as « بنوف », which M. le P. Cheikho was unable to identify. (Ibid : Op. cit. pp. 317, 350 N. 5). But with the change of the last letter « ف » into « ق », the singular form of the resulting word « بنوق » becomes strikingly similar to the English word « pink » i.e. a ship with a very narrow stern. Another type of sailing craft which may also help in identifying the « بنف » of Sheikho's text is the « nef ». See Daphne Muir's historical novel : *The Lost Crusade* p. 91. As for the other type of boat, namely the « جرم », see Makhairas Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 639, 651, vol. II. 218, 220. It is interesting to know too that the type of ship called in French « taforese » meaning « vaisseau plat pour le transport de la cavalerie », is given by Dozy (op. cit.) as equivalent to the remarkably similar Arabic word « طيفور », which does not however, occur in the Egyptian Chronicles of the Fifteenth Century. The English words brigantine, brig and grab, will be used indiscriminately whenever the word « غراب » occurs.

- 4 --- Makrizi : *Sulûk*, vol. IV. fol. 85A (Brit. Mus. Ms. Or 2902; Abû-l-Mahâsin : *Nudjûm*, vol. VI. p. 561 (ed. Popper). The Arabic Chronicles do not go beyond the word « Efreng » meaning Frankish, in designating the nationality of the pirates. According to W. Heyd (*Histoire de Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age*, vol. II. p. 475, the Efreng corsairs on this occasion were Catalans.
- 5 — Abû-l-Mahâsin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 567; 'Aini : *'Ikd*. fol. 159 B. (Bibl. Nat. Ms. Arabe 1544); Ibn Hadjar : *Inba*, fol. 267 A. (Brit. Mus. Ms. Rich. 7321).
- 6 — According to Saleh ibn Yahyâ (Sheikho : Op. cit. p. 315), the pirates of this incident were Baskawiya (Basques?), and it was only one merchant ship which the corsairs did seize. This was laden with soap from Tripolis in Syria; and it was owned by Ahmad Ibn el-Hamim, a merchant of Damietta.
- 7 — Abû-l-Mahâsin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 580; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 96 A.; Khalil B. Shahin : *Zubdat* etc. (ed. Ravaisse) p. 138.
- 8 — *Camb. Med. Hist.* vol. IV. p. 470. Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 531. Makhairas whose Chronicle is the base of that of Strambaldi expatiates a little more on this subject of the pirates. He also allots a considerable share of responsibility to King Janus. Thus he writes for the year 1409 : « And the said King Janus began the war with the Saracens; and the Cypriots were pillaging them from the year 1404 after Christ onwards. And the Sultan endured it in silence for many years, for many of the emirs were not on good terms with him. . . . And the rulers were getting rich, and so were all the rest

- from Saracen plunder » (Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 622-23; vol. II. p. 212 note 2 to Paragraph 636.)
- 9 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 623, 629.
- 10 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 629; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 22A.; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 215B.
- 11 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 623.
- 12 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 629.
- 13 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 629-31.
- 14 — Khalil Ibn Shahin : Op. cit. p. 138.
- 15 — The only evidence that this was one of Barsbey's motives is the assertion of 'Aini, who was a personal friend of the Sultan Barsbey and in his confidence. (See 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 168 A.)
- 16 — Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 101 A. Captain Fadil could not have been the Saracen slave who escaped from Cyprus to Egypt, and told the Sultan how the corsairs were ravaging his coasts, and how the Cypriots purchased the goods from them. Fādīl is identified with the tall Mamlūk who was captured by the Cypriots in 1425. (See Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 631, Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 532.)
- 17 — Strambaldi : Op. cit. 535. As will be seen, the Genoese in Famagusta actually facilitated the task of the Mamluks during the various stages of their campaign in the Island of Cyprus in 1424 and 1425. Long before then, Janus had tried by war to end the hold of the Genoese over Famagusta, with the sole result that he was compelled in 1409 to sign, on the advice of the Grand Master of Rhodes, an onerous treaty, on the lines of the one which his father had signed in 1374. It was clearly in the interest of the Genoese that Janus should be kept occupied by another foe. (See Vertot : History of the Knights of Rhodes. Vol. I. pp. 308-310; Camb. Med. History. Vol. IV. p. 470; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 209, 210-211.)
- 18 — Vertot : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 324; see also Enc. Isl. Art. Djakmak (Cakmak).
- 19 — Enc. Isl. Art. Cyprus.
- 20 — Abū-l-Mahāsin : Op. cit. Vol. VI. p. 608.
- 21 — Enc. Isl. Art. Cyprus.
- 22 — Abū-l-Mahāsin, Op. cit. Vol. VI. p. 580. Before going any further, it is necessary to point out that the story of the three expeditions against Cyprus, as given here, is based primarily upon 'Aini's version in his chronicle 'Ikd al Djumān (fols. 168 A. — 174 A. (Bibl. Nat. Ms. Ar. No. 1544). There are several other versions in Arabic, as well as that of Makhairas in Cypriot Greek and Strambaldi's in Italian.
- 23 — Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 87 A. Regarding the type of boat known in Arabic as « سارة », Dozy does not go beyond « sorte de barque » in giving its meaning, but also gives a Greek equivalent.

- 24 — Ibn Hadjar (Op. cit. fol. 271a) confuses this puny expedition with the one which took place in the following year, and gives the number of the troops of the latter as that of the first expedition. The version of Saleh ibn Yahya (Op. cit. pp. 315-316), regarding this expedition, tallies in essential detail with the others; but it adds that three of the five ships which constituted the flotilla were fitted with 180 oars each, the other two were of a much less capacity.
- 25 — Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 138; Mas Latrie (Op. cit. Docs. vol. I, p. 507, N. 1.) identified Ras Alyak with Cape Gatto south of Limassol.
- 26 — 'Aini and Strambaldi and Makhairas agree with Khalil B. Shahin's version as to the arrival of the expedition at Cape Gatto, and its immediate advance towards Limassol. Makrizi (Op. cit. vol. IV, fol. 97 A) and Abu-l-Mahasin (Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 882), who copied from the former and was therefore echoing his master's voice, asserted that the expedition arrived first at Famagusta and then proceeded to Limassol. This would mean that Ras Alyak should be identified, not with Cape Gatto, but Cape Elaea north of Famagusta. Ibn Hadjar (Op. cit. fol. 271A), together with a much later disciple (Author Unknown : Life of Kaitbey, fol. 59B), who copied slavishly from him, agreed with Makrizi's assertion, which would be, however, improbable considering the size of the expedition and the distance between Cape Elaea and Limassol.
- 27 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 631; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 531.
- 28 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 631-33; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 531; Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 582.
- 29 — Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 138.
- 30 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 531.
- 31 — Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV, fol. 97A. It is surprising that such a well-informed authority as Ibn Hadjar should say that the number of prisoners was 16000. This is clearly a copyist's mistake, in which Ibn Hadjar's plagiarist (see Note No. 26) could only persist. For the distribution of the booty according to the law of Islam, see Enc. Isl. Arts. Fai' and Ghanima.
- 32 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 582; Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 138.
- 33 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 582-583; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fols. 99B, 100B.
- 34 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 584. Djerbash is the Shirmash of Salih Ibn Yahya (Op. cit. p. 316), and of Aini too (Op. cit. fol. 168B.).
- 35 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 588.
- 36 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 588; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV, fols. 100 B., 101 A.
- 37 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 584; Ibid : Op. cit. vol. IV, fol. 99B.

- 38 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 585; Ibid. Op. cit. IV. fol. 99 B.
- 39 — Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 139; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 274 B.; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633.
- 40 — Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 532; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV, fols. 99B., 100A.
- 41 — Khaill B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 139; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 274 B.
- 42 — Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV, fol. 100B; Strambaldi p. 532. The former authority gave Laodicea as the town, while the latter said Jazza, which Mas Latrie corrected to Lajazzo (Ayas), the native town of Captain Fadil. Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633) mentions only this incident of all that happened to Thomas Provosto.
- 43 — Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 274 B. Neither Makhairas nor Strambaldi mention any thing of Dan Palol in this connection.
- 44 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 590; Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 139; Salih Ibn Yahya (Op. cit. p. 317) commanded the grab from Beirut in this expedition.
- 45 — Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 532. According to Salih Ibn Yahya. Op. cit. p. 317), and 'Aini (Op. cit. fol. 169A) the flotilla stayed for about ten days at the harbour of Tripolis, an interval long enough for a messenger to go to Cyprus and come back. In note No. 2 on the same page in Saleh Ibn Yahya, Janus is said to have been inclined towards peace, but his brother was for war.
- 46 — According to Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633, vol. II, p. 216) the Muslim fleet first came to Khelones, on the south coast of the Carpasi Peninsula just south of Rizokarpaso.
- 47 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 590.
- 48 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI p. 590; Khalil ibn Shahin : Op. cit. p. 140.
- 49 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 169 B.; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 533. Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633) follows the campaign very closely.
- 50 — Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 169 B.; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 533; Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 633-35.
- 51 — Khalil ibn Shahin : Op. cit. p. 140.
- 52 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 591; Saleh ibn Yahya : Op. cit. p. 318.
- 53 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 591.; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 319; Khalil ibn Shahin : Op. cit. pp. 140-141; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 533.
- 54 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 169 B.; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 533.
- 55 — Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 169B; Khalil ibn Shahin : Op. cit. p. 141. The person in charge of the munition carts was called by both authorities Ayn al-Ghazal who, according to the former authority, " was a Circassian.

Christians and become a Mameluk to them ». According to the latter authority, « he was one of the courtiers of the lord of Cyprus »: this seems to identify him with Sir John Gasel. (See Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 631; and Mas Latrie : Docs. I. p. 509.

- 56 — Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 533. According to Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 637) the Prince chafed against the appointment of the counsellors, and « found it very hard to bear that the was held in so tightly ».
- 57 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 637; 'Aini : op. cit. fol. 170A.
- 58 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 170A.
- 59 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 593.
- 60 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI, p. 593; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 102 A.
- 61 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 593; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 534; Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 637) deals at some length with this last stage of the campaign. According to Saleh ibn Yahya (Op. cit. p. 319) the destination of the departing flotilla was Paphos, but the contrariness of the winds finally decided the commanders to steer homeward.
- 62 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI pp. 590, 592; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 102A.
- 63 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 170B; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 102B.
- 64 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 593; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 102B.
- 65 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 170 B; Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 593; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV. fol. 102 B.
- 66 — Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 534; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 573A. A short necrological notice of Shaikh Muhammad, who died in June 1433, is to be found in Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 308A.
- 67 — Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 274 A.
- 68 — Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 273 A; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 534, and note 7. Ibn Hadjar, however, put Rabi I, 828 (January, 1425) as the month in which the Shaikh sent his son to Cyprus; it is therefore a case of choosing between Strambaldi and Ibn Hadjar; but it is probable that the latter meant Rabi I, 829 (January 1426). This peace move is dealt with at great length in Makhairas, but the date of it is not mentioned. (Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 639-49; vol. II. pp. 218-19). A letter which the Shaikh had given to his son, to hand to King Janus and which the king was never allowed to see, is preserved in Makhairas too. The son, however, went back to his father with an answer from King Janus. Its main points are that the King defies the Sultan; the king's army is as good as the Sultan's; that if the Catalans have pillaged in Syria, he is not to blame; that the Cypriots have a right to buy and sell where they please, especially with other Christians.

- 69 — See Mas. Latrie : Op. cit. Docs. vol. I. pp. 516-517.
- 70 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 599; Makrizi : Op. cit. vol. IV., fol. 107 B.
- 71 — Pero Tafur * Travels (ed. Letts) p. 65. Mosen Saurez is called « the nephew of the Lord of the Catalans », by the Egyptian annalists.
- 72 — Vertot : Op. cit. Vol. I. pp. 324, 325; 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 171A; Makhairas : Op. cit. Vol. I. p. 667.
- 73 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 171 A; Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 606.
- 74 — Khalil B. Shahin : Op. cit. p. 142; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 278; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 651-53; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 535.
- 75 — Ibid : Op. cit. p. 142; Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 278B. The would be Sultan Ina (The beardless) joined that expedition; he was then only a Lord of the Drum.
- 76 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. Vol. VI. p. 600.
- 77 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 599.
- 78 — Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 278 B.
- 79 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 775. But Ibn Hadjar (Op. cit. fol. 278 B), who was no friend of 'Aini, said it was Badr-al-Din B. Muzhir who advised the Sultan not to be discouraged. Saleh ibn Yahya (Op. cit. p. 321) was expected to join this expedition too with a transport from Beyrut, but the contrariness of the winds at Damietta delayed his ship till after the general departure.
- 80 — Salih Ibn Yahya : Op. cit. p. 321. Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 278 B. The latter authority added that as soon as the Alexandria squadron had left the port to join the main fleet off Rosetta, some resident Franks succeeded in informing the Cypriot squadron of the fact, and the latter thereupon sailed into the harbour of Alexandria to do their worst. But the storm which had upset the Egyptian plan, had also confounded the calculations of the Frank spies in Alexandria. Of the flotilla from the day it sailed from Bulak, Abu-l-Mahasin gives a slightly different version (see Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI, pp. 601-603).
- 81 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 171 B; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 535.
- 82 — Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 171 B; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 278 B; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 653.
- 83 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI, pp. 604-605. The same authority gives the date of storming the castle as 3 July.
- 84 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 172 A.

- 85 — Khalil ibn Shahin : Op. cit. p. 142; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 278 B; Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 653-55) mentions three envoys, the third of whom, a Cypriot villager, was entrusted with a letter to Janus, the text of which is also in Makhairas, vol. I. pp. 655-57).
- 86 — Ibid : Op. cit. p. 142; Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 278 B; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 533-36; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 657.
- 87 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 172 A; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 536-537; Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 657-658.
- 88 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. 172 A; Ibid : Op. cit. pp. 537-538; Ibid : Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. pp. 657-67. The two Cypriot accounts are sober and detailed, whereas the account of 'Aini is bombastic and engenderally vague. See also Cobham : Bishop Graziani's Chronicle, p. 11. The number of slain on both sides must have been great. Abu-l-Mahasin (Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 607) said, on the authority of eyewitnesses, that the Christians left 2000; Khalil Ibn Shahin (Op. cit. p. 143) estimated them at 6000. Well might 'Aini (Op. cit. fol. 172 B.) say boastfully that the number of their slain was incalculable « many others were wounded and non was unhurt save those whose predestined hour had not arrived ». Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 657-667) was in charge of the wine during this campaign, his narrative is full of essential details, but he is also most clear on the causes of the defeat of King Janus.
- 89 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 172 B. According to Khalil Ibn Shahin (Op. cit. 143) and Ibn Hadjar (Op. cit. fol. 279 A) the Mamluks carried the Great Cross with them to Larnaka. Félix Fabri : Wanderings (ed. A. Stewart), (vol. I. p. 192, 195-197) gave a graphic account of the Great Cross which he saw in Cyprus in 1488.
- 90 — 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 173 B.
- 91 — Ibid : Op. cit. fols. 173B-174A; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 539.
- 92 — Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 279 A. Makhairas (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 667, vol. II. p. 227) relates that no sea fight took place, for when the Muslims sighted the Christian ships, the Mamluk commander « forced the King to write a letter to the fleet to order it to retire; and they played the coward and retired, taking the King's pay and doing nothing for it ». He mentions, however, (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 671) that the King's ships came back after being dismissed, causing much alarm to the victors.
- 93 — Makhairas : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 667-69; Strambaldi : Op. cit. p. 540.
- 94 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 669-71; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 540.
- 95 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 671; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 540; 'Aini : Op. cit. fol. 173 A.
- 96 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. I. p. 671-73; Ibid : Op. cit. p. 541; Ibid : Op. cit. 173 A. It is comforting that 'Aini condemned these atrocities in an emphatic way.

- 97 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 608.
- 98 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 603.
- 99 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 604.
- 100 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 609.
- 101 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 611.
- 102 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 612. It happened in that year that the building of the Ashrafiya Madrassa (School) was completed, and the Sultan saw fit to have the crown of Cyprus suspended on the porch, in commemoration of his victory. Ibn Ayas (Badai' (ed. Cairo) vol. II. p. 18) who lived to 1522, wrote that « up to now it was still hanging on the gate of that school ». A much later writer added that Barsbey paid the expenses of building this school « out of the Cypriot booty in that year ».
- 103 — A graphic description of the procession is in Abu-l-Mahasin (Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 612-613). As for the number of prisoners it is difficult to obtain a clear estimate. According to Abu-l-Mahasin (Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 613) they numbered about 1000, besides those who were carried by the volunteers into their districts without permission of the Commander in Chief. Ibn Hadjar (Op. cit. fol. 279 A) estimated them at 37000 prisoners; and Khalil Ibn Shahin (Op. cit. p. 144) at 36000.
- 104 — Abu-l-Mahasin : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 613-614; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 279B.
- 105 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 614; Ibid : Op. cit. fol. 279 B.
- 106 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 614.
- 107 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 615.
- 108 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 616; Ibn Hadjar : Op. cit. fol. 280 A.
- 109 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 616-617; Pero Tafur : Op. cit. pp. 67, 70.
- 110 — Ibid : Op. cit. vol. VI. p. 617.
-